N egotiations are often conducted under the stipulation that an impasse is to be resolved using final-offer arbitration (FOA). In fact, FOA frequently is not needed; in Major League Baseball, for instance, more than 80% of the salary negotiations that could go to arbitration instead reach a bargained agreement. We show that the risk aversion of at least one side explains this phenomenon. We then model pay negotiation in baseball by applying a bargaining solution with a variable disagreement outcome representing FOA, studying the existence of pure Nash equilibrium initial offers and their effects on the player's eventual pay, and considering the Nash solution as a special case.
Introduction
Institutional arrangements under which binding arbitration ends labor-management and other two-sided disputes are now common. An arbitrated settlement is imposed if no agreement is reached by a specified date. Often, this settlement is determined by finaloffer arbitration, a procedure that is widely believed to induce bargainers to adopt "reasonable" positions. We study how anticipation of this form of arbitration affects prior bargaining.
Final-offer arbitration (FOA) was first proposed by Stevens in 1966 . Under FOA, the arbitrator, or arbitration panel, must choose either the proposal of one side or the proposal of the other; averaging or blending the two sides' positions is not permitted. FOA is now an adjunct to bargaining in the determination of wages of public-sector employees, settlements in workers' compensation cases, and salaries of Major League Baseball (MLB) players who are not yet eligible for free agency (see Commission on Health and Safety and Workers' Compensation 1999, a general bibliography on FOA, and Major League Baseball Players Association 2006, the MLB basic collective agreement for [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . Because MLB is highly visible and information is readily available, we use the baseball setting for concreteness. (Indeed, in workers' compensation and other domains, FOA is called "baseball arbitration.") Baseball's experience with FOA has produced an intriguing observation: Of the players who file for arbitration and exchange offers with their teams, only about 15%-20% end up in arbitration-the remainder reach a negotiated agreement (Miller 2005) . The stability of this statistic has led many commentators to suggest that the prospect of FOA must induce bargainers to settle (e.g., Gardner 1995) . This view is supported by the experimental findings of Manzini and Mariotti (2001) that the availability of arbitration, even if it requires mutual consent, affects negotiation outcomes dramatically.
But exactly how does the possibility of FOA rationally affect bargaining strategy? We model the FOA outcome as determined by the parties' offers and the realization of a random variable representing the arbitrator's preferred settlement.
1 Thus, we ask what offers are best for the parties, given that the same 1 We assume that each party has the same distribution over the arbitrator's preferred settlement; i.e., the parties have identical information about the arbitrator. This one-dimensional model was apparently initiated by Crawford (1982) . A model with differing beliefs could be constructed, based for example on Myerson offers will be input into FOA if there is no bargaining agreement.
An important insight of Nash (1950) is that the outcome of bargaining depends crucially on the disagreement point. If FOA is the "default" outcome of bargaining, the disagreement point can be thought of as random.
2 It is not difficult to see the effects of this arrangement if both sides are risk-neutral. No matter what the probability that FOA selects one position or the other, any settlement that is better than going to FOA for one party must be worse for the other. Thus, under risk-neutrality, FOA gives the bargainers no extra incentive to reach an agreement.
But things are different if one party, or both, is risk-averse. Several authors (including Wittman 1986 , Curry and Pecorino 1993 , and Kilgour 1994 argue that at least one party-in the baseball context, the player-should be modeled as risk-averse, because for him the arbitration is an extraordinary, perhaps once-in-a-lifetime, event. These studies focus on whether a more risk-averse party wins FOA more often, and at what cost. Our interest is different: We explore the consequences of imposing a formal negotiation stage between the initial offers and FOA; negotiation might produce an agreement, and then the arbitration stage would be redundant.
Part of our explanation of why FOA is not invoked very often is that risk aversion implies that there are bargains the parties could reach that would be Pareto improvements over FOA. Later, we show how such a bargain could be in equilibrium. We use a model that opens with a risk-averse player stating his demand while, simultaneously, a (possibly risk-averse) team states its offer. Were the parties actually to reach FOA, their expected utilities would depend on their offers as elaborated in the literature. 3 We first show formally, and illustrate, that for all likely pairs of initial offers-including Nash equilibrium offers-there is a range of settlements preferred by both sides to FOA. In other words, FOA creates an incentive to reach a bargained agreement. Then, assuming that bargaining is resolved according to a reasonable general solution, we obtain bounds on pure-strategy equilibrium offers. Finally, we suppose that the bargaining solution is the (1984) , but because offers would reflect differential information this model would be less likely to explain why agreements are so common. Besides, different beliefs seem unlikely in the baseball context, where relevant information (playing statistics and salaries) is widely available (Greenstein et al. 2004 ). Other models of arbitrator behavior, e.g., Farmer and Pecorino (1998) , do not seem to lend themselves to this kind of analysis.
Nash solution (Nash 1950) and derive comparative statics.
Our model is related to, but different from, earlier work. Nash (1953) introduces the Nash threat game, a noncooperative game model of the selection of a disagreement point in a cooperative game. This game is equivalent to a zero-sum game, a fact that Nash uses to find "optimal threat strategies."
4 Adapting the Nash Threat Game to FOA, Crawford (1982) analyzes how utilities are related to arbitrator characteristics at equilibrium.
Our model is different from the Nash threat game and from Crawford's model of FOA and bargaining, but closer to the latter. The fact that disagreement payoffs are not linearly related to strategies reflects the FOA structure of the inner game. Because mixed-strategy offers are difficult to interpret, we focus on pure-strategy equilibria and the settlements they imply. The analysis is more intricate because we must deal directly with nonlinearities. Thus, our model addresses new issues of theory; as well, our conclusions inform a central aspect of an important application.
Risk Aversion and Incentives to Bargain
In our model, the only issue is the annual pay of a player, P , who is under contract to a team, T . Suppose that T offers a and P demands b, and that P 's preference is described by a utility function u P · . (Later we introduce a utility for T as well.) Now suppose that FOA is carried out by an arbitrator whose assessment of P 's market value is unknown, and that both T and P believe that this assessment follows a continuous cumulative distribution function, F . If a < b, the arbitrator will choose the closer of a and b to the realized value of F . Then T 's expected wealth is equal to a constant plus
while P 's expected utility is
If a ≥ b then P 's pay is set at the midpoint of a and b,
We now assume that P is risk-averse (and, of course, nonsatiated) and ask whether, given a and b with a < b, there is a compromise, x, that both parties prefer to FOA. Both parties would be better off if P 's pay were equal to such a mutually improving value x.
To be specific, our assumptions on u P are that u P > 0 and u P < 0. We are searching for values of x such that −x > d T , which is equivalent to
because u P is strictly increasing, and
It is evident that there are values of x that satisfy both (3) and (4) if and only if
But, as (1) and (2) make clear, −d T is the expected value of the lottery representing FOA, so u P −d T is the utility of that expected value, while d P is P 's expected utility for that lottery. Jensen's inequality applies because u P is concave so (5) holds provided 0 < F a + b /2 < 1, i.e., the lottery is nondegenerate. We conclude that the interval u
T is nonempty and that every x within it satisfies (3) and (4). Thus, if one party is risk-averse there are mutually improving settlements, which are preferred by both parties to FOA.
If both parties are risk-averse, P with utility function u P and T with utility function u T , then mutually improving settlements x satisfy two conditions,
Define the function g by g
Then g is increasing and concave, and u P x = g −u T −x . Now (6) and (7) can be rewritten as
It follows that a mutually improving settlement, x, exists iff the right side of (9) is less than the right side of (8), which can occur only if 0 < F a + b /2 < 1. The required relation again follows from Jensen's inequality, which applies because g is concave. As above, the mutually improving settlements form a nonempty open interval.
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We illustrate with an example in which only the player, P , is risk-averse. Example 1.
F ∼ Uniform 10 14
Using (2) and (4), the second condition is
Our argument above shows that it is always possible to find values of x that satisfy both inequalities.
To illustrate, we have solved for and tabulated the intervals of mutually improving settlements for various a b pairs in Example 1:
Mutually improving settlements 10 14 11 916 < x < 12 11 13 11 979 < x < 12 11 14 12 083 < x < 12 125 10 13 11 829 < x < 11 875
For instance, if T offers to pay P 10 but P demands 14, both parties would prefer to settle for any pay level strictly between 11 916 and 12, rather than go on to FOA. In this sense, adjoining FOA to bargaining creates incentives to reach agreement; how such agreements might unfold is the topic we address next.
Bargaining Followed by FOA
Define the bargaining FOA (BFOA) game as a twoperson noncooperative game N S T S P v T v P with player set N = T P and strategy sets S T = S P = . As usual, T 's strategy is a pay offer, a, and P 's strategy is a pay demand, b. 
The feasible set of the bargaining problem is
Note that this result holds whether P 's risk aversion is greater than, equal to, or less than T 's.
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where is the set of all simple (finite) money lotteries, and Eu i l is player i's expected utility for lottery l ∈ , for i = T P. Thus, the BFOA game represents bargaining between T and P , with any disagreement to be resolved by FOA.
We assume that u T and u P are twice continuously differentiable and strictly increasing. We also assume that the arbitrator's distribution F is known to both players, is continuously differentiable, and has compact support; we denote the support of F by D U ⊆ , where D is the maximum solution of F D = 0 and U is the minimum solution of F U = 1. We also assume that F is strictly increasing on D U and denote by f the corresponding density function.
Of course, the BFOA game is not fully specified until we indicate how the outcome of the bargaining problem, C d a b , is to be determined. First, analogous to Nash (1951) , we make minimal assumptions about the resolution of bargaining and study the resulting Nash equilibria.
Assume that the bargaining outcome is always efficient and strictly dominates the FOA (disagreement) outcome whenever it is possible to do so. Assume further that the team T and the player P are risk-averse, so that an efficient outcome is a degenerate lottery, i.e., a sure pay level for P . In particular, the BFOA game is strictly competitive, and all Nash equilibria (if any) are equivalent in the sense that T 's payoffs at every equilibrium are equal, and so are P 's. Note that, if the FOA outcome d a b is itself efficient (which occurs whenever the choices a and b make the FOA lottery, based on F , degenerate), then x a b is simply defined by u P x a b = d P a b .
We now consider the BFOA game in the more typical case when the FOA outcome, 6 Our intention is to discuss a broad class of bargaining solutions without regard to explicit functional forms. But note that we demonstrate below that the Nash bargaining solution satisfies all of our assumptions, including Condition C1. In this condition, the opposite directions of the inequalities for T and P imply that each player gains from improvement in the disagreement outcome, a requirement that reflects the strictly competitive nature of the game.
Provided all derivatives are well defined, we have We can now establish some important properties of the BFOA game. 
It follows from (P1-3) and (P1-4) that, at any Nash equilibrium a
Note that a * < D is possible, as is b * > U . Proposition 1 demonstrates many properties that a Nash equilibrium must have in the BFOA game, but it does not establish that such equilibria exist. In general, existence is an issue; many games, even with well behaved, continuous payoffs, have no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 8 We now introduce Condition C2, a mild "partial" concavity condition that guarantees that each player has a unique best response to every strategy of the opponent.
Condition C2. For a < b and D < a + b /2 < U , if x/ a = 0, then 2 x/ a 2 > 0 and if x/ b = 0 then 2 x/ b 2 < 0. The next proposition shows that Conditions C1 and C2 together are sufficient for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium, which is a saddle point because the game is strictly competitive.
Proposition 2. If Conditions C1 and C2 both hold, then the BFOA game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
If F represents a uniform distribution, so that f c = 1/ U − D for c ∈ D U , then we can give sufficient conditions for C2 in terms of the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion for player i, defined by R i z ≡ −u i z /u i z . 7 Proofs of propositions are in the appendix. 8 For example, the strictly competitive game with payoff functions a − b 2 and − a − b 2 has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Condition C1 holds and that F represents a uniform distribution. Then Condition C2 is also satisfied provided that
Below, we show that Condition C2-1 holds for the Nash bargaining solution.
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Note that neither a uniform arbitrator's distribution nor the two conditions of Proposition 3 are necessary for the existence or uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. For instance, the next example has a unique Nash equilibrium even though all three of these conditions are violated.
Example 2. Suppose that the arbitrator's distribution is
Thus, the support of the distribution is 10 14 and larger values have higher probabilities. Suppose further that the bargaining outcome equals the average certainty equivalent of the disagreement outcome values for both players, which is equivalent to 4. An Illustration: The Nash Bargaining Solution
To sharpen some of the results obtained above, we now assume that, for any a and b with a < b, the bargaining problem C d a b is resolved using the Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950) . 11 Thus, the 9 In fact, it also holds for all nonsymmetric (weighted) Nash solutions.
10 To see that a * b * is a Nash equilibrium, note that a * is a best response for T to b * , because a * is the unique solution of x/ a a b * = 0 that satisfies a < b and D < a + b /2 < U. Moreover, the endpoints 2D − b * and 2U − b * are worse for T than a * because x a * b
Similarly it can be verified that b * is a best response for P to a * .
11 The Nash bargaining solution can of course be derived from axioms (Nash 1950 (Nash , 1953 , but it has also been justified on noncooperative, strategic grounds (Binmore et al. 1986 , Rubinstein et al. 1992 ).
outcome is the player's pay level that maximizes the product of the improvements in the parties' utilities relative to their expected utilities under FOA. For the team, this improvement is u T − x − d T ≥ 0; for the player, it is u P x − d P ≥ 0. The Nash solution is therefore defined by
The second derivative of the maximand in (10),
is negative for concave u T and u P , provided that 
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Now assume that the team T is risk-neutral and write u T z = z. Solving the first pair and then the last pair of equations of (12) for F a + b /2 yields
To verify this solution, assume that the player P is also risk-neutral, and write u P z = z. Then it is easy to check that F a + b /2 = . It is straightforward to show that, when the players are risk-neutral, the outcome of the BFOA game is a
Returning now to the case in which T is risk-neutral but P is not, we find that equilibrium offers are not centered on the median, m, of the distribution F . This is the content of the following corollary to Proposition 1:
Corollary 1. If the player P is risk-averse and team T is risk-neutral, then at any Nash equilibrium
Proof. Risk aversion implies that u P is increasing and concave, so that u P b
which implies that a * + b * /2 < m. We close with a specific example that uses the Nash bargaining solution, a risk-neutral team, and a riskaverse player.
Example 3. Suppose that player P has utility u P z = 0 01z − e −0 2z . Note that u P z = 0 01 + 0 2e
and that P is risk-averse because u P < 0. Suppose further that the arbitrator's distribution is uniform on D U = 10 14 so that m = 12 and F c = c − 10 /4 for 10 ≤ c ≤ 14. Note that all hypotheses of Proposition 3 hold because −u P z /u P z = 0 04/ 0 01e 0 2z + 0 2 < 1/ 14 − 10 for any z < 14. Then a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the BFOA game (13) The unique solution of (13) 
Thus, bargaining benefits the risk-averse player relative to FOA, in that the player receives x a * b * from bargaining but only (the equivalent of) s P a * b * from FOA. But a risk-averse player achieves a smaller settlement than a risk-neutral player, who receives m, the median of the arbitrator's distribution.
Conclusions
The objective of this article has been to assess the extent to which adjoining FOA to a bargaining process tends to induce bargaining agreement. Experience in Major League Baseball and elsewhere suggests that this institutional arrangement often, but not always, leads to agreement. We have attempted to link this observation to theory.
Our primary argument is that risk aversion explains why parties come to an agreement, rather than submit to FOA. If at least one side is risk-averse, then there are agreements that both sides find preferable to FOA. Our results hold despite our assumption that both sides have the same beliefs about what the arbitrator considers fair; these beliefs may favor one side or the other, but we require that both sides agree on them. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
The observation that the bargainers are unable to "divide the dollar" in up to 20% of cases may reflect disagreements about the arbitrator's distribution; an alternative explanation, one that we think unlikely, is that both sides are risk-neutral, which would imply that there is no settlement that both prefer to FOA. The evidence we uncovered about the effect of FOA on prior bargaining is generally consistent with experience in baseball. We argued that players are most likely to be risk-averse, and in MLB players win about 60% of FOA decisions. As has been found elsewhere, FOA induces the more risk-averse party to be less demanding; if so, this party wins more often, but achieves less favorable settlements, than if it were risk-neutral.
When first proposed, final-offer arbitration was believed by many to be capable of inducing closure in bargaining-to draw the parties so close together that settlement would be automatic, or at least an easy step. But it is now generally accepted that, in FOA and related procedures, parties with equal information do not rationally diverge widely-but do not usually converge either. (See Armstrong 2004 and Brams et al. 1991 .) However, newer arbitration procedures, such as Zeng's AFOA (Zeng 2003) , appear to induce convergence reliably; they may be even more likely than FOA to lead to agreements in prior bargaining. 
